This paper surveys a number of kinds of default reasoning in Artificial Intelligence, specifically, default assignments to variables, the closed world assumption, the frame default for causal worlds, exceptions as defaults, and negation in Artificial Intelligence programming languages. Some of these defaults provide clear representational and computational advantanges over their corresponding first order theories. Finally, the paper discusses various difficulties associated with default theories.
Intelligence in general. We use the term "default reasoning" to denote the process of arriving at conclusions based upon patterns of inference of the form "In the absence of any information to the contrary, assume..." In this paper, we take this pattern to have the more formal meaning "If certain information cannot be deduced from the given knowledge base, then conclude..." Such reasoning represents a form of plausible inference and is typically required whenever conclusions must be drawn despite the absence of total knowledge about a world.
In order to fix some of these ideas, we begin by surveying a number of instances of default reasoning as they are commonly invoked in A.I.
Specifically, we discuss default assignments to variables, the clo~ed world assumption, the frame default for causal worlds, exceptions as defaults, and negation in A.I. programming languages. We shall see that these may all be formalized by introducing a single default operator ~ where #W is taken to mean "W is not deducible from the given knowledge base".
In addition, we shall discover that the closed world and frame defaults provide clear representational and computational advantages over their corresponding first order theories. The former eliminates the need for an explicit representation of negative knowledge about a world, while the latter eliminates the so-called frame axioms for dynamic worlds.
Finally, we discuss various problems which arise as a result of augmenting first order logic with a default operator.
SOME INSTANCES OF DEFAULT REASONING IN A.I.
The use of default reasoning in A.I. is far more widespread than is commonly realized. The purpose of this section is to point out a variety of seemingly different situations in which such reasoning arises, to accent common patterns which emerge when defaults are formalized, and to indicate certain representational and computational advantages of default reasoning.
Default Assignments to Variables
A number of knowledge representation schemes, e.g. FRL [Roberts and Goldstein 1977] , KRL [Bobrow and Winograd 1977] , explicitly provide for the assignment of default values to variables (slots, terminals). For example, in KRL the unit for a person in an airline travel system has the form: [Hayes 1977] , as part of the reasoner's process structure.
The most common such default corresponds to what has elsewhere been referred to as the closed world assumption [Reiter 1978] . In this section we describe two commonly used closed world defaults.
Hierarchies
As Now if Fido is known to be a dog we can conclude that Fido is animate in either of two essentially isomorphic ways:
I. If the hierarchy is implemented as some sort of network, then we infer ANIMATE(fido) if the class ANIMATE lies "above" DOG i.e. there is some pointer chain leading from node DOG to node ANIMATE in the network.
2. If the hierarchy is implemented as a set of first order formulae, then we conclude ANIMATE(fido) if we can forward chain (modus ponens) with DOG(fido) to derive ANIMATE(fido). This forward chaining from DOG(fido) to ANIMATE(fido) corresponds exactly to following pointers from node DOG to node ANIMATE in the network.
Thus far, there is no essential difference between a network representation of a hierarchy with its pointer-chasing interpreter and a first order representation with its forward chaining theorem proving interpreter. A fundamental distinction arises with respect to negation. As an example, consider how one deduces that Fido is not a reptile.
A network interpreter will determine that the node REPTILE does not lie "above" DOG and will thereby conclude that DOGs are not REPTILEs so that ~REPTILE(fido) is deduced. On the other hand, a theorem prover will try to prove ~REPTILE(fido).
Given the above first order representation, no such proof exists. The reason is clear -nothing in the representation (2.1) states that the categories MAMMAL and REPTILE are disjoint.
For the theorem prover to deal with negative information, the knowledge base (2.1) must be augmented by the following facts stating that the categories of the hierarchy are disjoint:
It is now clear that a first order theorem proving interpreter can establish ~REPTILE(fido) by a pure forward chaining proof procedure from DOG(fido) using (2.1) and (2.2). However, unlike the earlier proof of ANIMATE(fido), this proof of~REPTILE (fido) is not isomorphic to that 9enerated by the network interpreter. (Recall that the network interpreter deduces ~REPTILE(fido) by failing to find a pointer chain linking DOG and REPTILE). Moreover, while the network interpreter must contend only with a representation equivalent to that of (2.1), the theorem prover must additionally utilize the negative information (2.2). Somehow, then, the process structure of the network interpreter implicitly represents the negative knowledge (2.2), while computing only on declarative knowledge equivalent to (2.1).
We can best distinguish the two approaches by observing that two different logics are involved.
To see this, consider modifying the theorem prover so as to simulate the network process structure.
Since the network interpreter tries, and fails, to establish a pointer chain from DOG to REPTILE using a declarative knowledge base equivalent to (2.1), the theorem prover can likewise attempt to prove REPTILE(fido) using only (2.1). As for the network interpreter, this attempt will fail.
If we now endow the theorem prover with the additional inference rule:
"If you fail to deduce REPTILE(fido) then conclude ~REPTILE(fido)" the deduction of ~REPTILE(fido) will be isomorphic to that of the network interpreter. More generally, we require an inference schema, applicable to any of the monadic predicates MAMMAL, DOG, CAT, etc. of the hierarchy: "If x is an individual and P(x) cannot be deduced, then infer ~P(x)" or in the notation of the previous section
What we have argued then is that the process structure of a network interpreter is formally equivalent to that of a first order theorem prover augmented by the ability to use the inference schema (D2). In a sense, a network interpreter is the compiled form of such an augmented theorem prover.
There are several points worth noting:
I. The schema (D2) is not a first order rule of inference since the operator ~ is not a first order notion. (It is a meta notion.) Thus a theorem prover which evokes (D2) in order to establish negative conclusions by failure is not performing first order deductions.
2. The schema (D2) has a similar pattern to the default schema (DI).
3. In the presence of the default schema (D2), the negative knowledge (2.2), which would be necessary in the absence of (D2), is not required.
As we shall see in the next section, this property is a general characteristic of the closed world default, and leads to a significant reduction in the complexity of both the representation and processing of knowledge.
The Closed World Default
The schema (D2) is actually a special case of the following more general default schema:
If (D3) is in force for all predicates P of some domain, then reasoning is being done under the closed world assumption [Reiter 1978 Notice that virtually all of the knowledge about the blocks domain is negative, namely the negative specific facts (11), together with the negative facts(1)-(7) I. This is not an accidental feature.
Most of what we know about any world is negative. Now a first order theorem prover must have access to all of the facts (1)-(ll). For example, in proving~SUPPORTS(C3,C2) it must use (4). Consider instead such a theorem prover endowed with the additional ability to interpret the closed world default schema (D3). Then, in attempting a proof of ~SUPPORTS(C3,C2) it tries to show that SUPPORTS(C3,C2) is not provable. Since SUPPORTS(C3,C2) cannot be proved, it concludes ~SUPPORTS(C3,C2), as required.
It should be clear intuitively that in the presence of the closed world default schema (D3), none of the negative facts (I)-(7), (11) need be represented explicitly nor used in reasoning. This can be proved, under fairly general condition~ [Reiter 1978 ]. One function, then, of the closed world default is to "factor out" of the representation all negative knowledge about the domain. It is of some interest to compare the blocks world representation (1)-(ll) with those commonly used in blocks world problem-solvers (e.g. [Winograd 1972 , Warren 1974 ). These systems do not represent explicitly the negative knowledge (I)- (7) able. To see why, consider an attempted update of the example blocks world scene with the new "fact" SUPPORTS(C3,C2). To detect the resulting inconsistency requires the negative fact (4). In general then, negative knowledge is necessary for maintaining the integrity of a data base. A consequence of the closed world assumption is a decomposition of knowledge into positive and negative facts. Only positive knowledge is required for querying the data base. Both positive and negative knowledge are required for maintaining the integrity of the data base.
DEFAULTS AND THE FRAME PROBLEM
The frame problem [Raphael 1971] The problem is that in general we will require a vast number of such axioms e.g. object locations also remain invariant when lights are switched on, when it thunders, when someone speaks etc. so there is a major difficulty in even articulating a deductively adequate set of frame axioms for a given world.
A solution to the frame problem is a representation of the world coupled with appropriate rules of inference such that the frame axioms are neither represented explicitly nor used explicitly in reasoning about the world. We will focus on a proposed solution by [Sandewall 1972 ] 1 . A related approach is described in [Hayes 1973 ]. Sandewall proposes a new operator, UNLESS, which takes formula W as argument. The intended interpretation of UNLESS(W) is "W can not be proved" i.e. it is identical to the operator F/ of this paper.
Sandewall proposes a single "frame inference rule" which, in the notation of this paper, can be para- 
DEFAULTS AND EXCEPTIONS
A good deal of what we know about the world is 1 [Kramosil 1975 ] claims to have proved that Sandewa11's approach is either meaningless or equivalent to a first order approach. See Section 4 for a discussion of this issue.
"almost always" true, with a few exceptions. For example, all birds fly except for penguins, ostriches, fledglings, etc. Given a particular bird, we will conclude that it flies unless we happen to know that is satisfies one of these exceptions. Nevertheless, we want it true of birds "in general" that they fly. How can we reconcilethese apparently conflicting points of view? The natural first order representation is inconsistent: 
FLY(x)
But with this representation, we cannot conclude of a "general" bird, that it can fly. To see why,
consider an attempt to prove FLY(tweety) where all we know of tweety is that she is a bird. Clearly there is no way in this hierarchy of establishing that penguins are animals. For h4erarchies the constraint imposed by exceptions is easily articulated: If P and Q are nodes with P below Q, and if (x)P(x) p Q(x) is true without exception, then there must be a sequence of solid links connecting P and Q. For more general kinds of knowledge the situation is more problematic. One must be careful to ensure that chains of implications do not unwittingly inherit unintended exceptions.
3. DEFAULTS AND "NEGATION" IN A.I. PROGRAMMI NG LANGUAGES It has been observed by several authors [Hayes 1973 , Sandewall 1972 , Reiter 1978 ] that the basicdefault operator ~ has,as its"procedural equivalent" the negation operator in a number of A.I. programming languages e.g. THNOT in MICROPLANNER [Hewitt 1972 , Sussman et al.1970 ,.NOT in PROLOG [Roussel 1975 ]. [Roussel 1975 ] -a pure theorem prover augmented with a "THNOT" operatorfor such diverse A.I. tasks as problem solving [Warren 1974 ], symbolic mathematics [Kanoui 1976] , and natural language question-answering [Colmeraurer 1973 ].
On the theoretical level, we are just begin- There are, of course, other advantages of the procedural approach -specifically, explicit control over reasoning -which are not accounted for by the above logical analysis. We have distinguished the purely logical structure of such representational languages from their process structure, and have argued that at least some of their success derives from the nature of the logic which they realize.
SOME PROBLEMS WITH DEFAULT THEORIES
Given that default reasoning has such widespread applications in A.I. it is natural to define a default theory as a first order theory augmented by one or more inference schemata like (Dl), (D2) etc. and to investigate the properties of such theories. Unfortunately, some such theories display peculiar and intuitively unacceptable behaviours.
One difficulty is the ease with which incon-~A sistent theories can be defined, for example B coupled with a knowledge base with the single fact IB. Another, pointed out by [Sandewall 1972 ] is that the theorems of certain default theories will depend upon the order in which they are derived. As an example, consider the theory ~A ~B Finally, it is not hard to see that default theories fail to satisfy the extension property [Hayes 1973 ] which all "respectable" logics do satisfy. (A logical calculus has the extension property iff whenever a formula is provable from a set P of premises, it is also provable from any set P' such that P ~ P'.) [Kramosil 1975 ] attempts to establish some general results on default theories. Kramosil "proves" that for any such theory, the default rules are irrelevant in the sense that either the theory will be meaningless or the theorems of the theory will be precisely the same as those obtainable by ignoring the default rules of inference.
Kramosil's result, if correct, would invalidate the main point of this paper, namely that default theories play a prominent role in reasoning about the world. Fortunately, his "proof" relies on an incorrect definition of theoremhood so that the problem of characterizing the theorems of a default theory remain open.
CONCLUSIONS
Default reasoning may well be the rule, rather than the exception, in reasoning about the world since normally we must act in the presence of incomplete knowledge. Moreover, aside from mathematics and the physical sciences, most of what we know about the world has associated exceptions and caveats. Conventional logics, such as first order logic, lack the expressive power to adequately represent the knowledge required for reasoning by default. We gain this expressive power by introducing the default operator.
In order to provide an adequate formal (as 
